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FREEDOM OF INFORMATION:
DUE PROCESS OF THE RIGHT
TO KNOW
Luis KUTNER*
A popular government without popular information, or the
means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy,
or perhaps both.
-James Madison
L ONG BEFORE the public mind was sharply focused upon the issue
brought about by the publication of the Pentagon Papers and by
other recent controversies over the denial of certain information (in-
cluding the executive branch's denying Senator J. W. Fulbright any ac-
cess to the five-year foreign military assistance plans),' there has been
a great concern expressed in regard to the public's right-to-know by this
writer and others. For example, Arthur Krock raised some pertinent
questions involving the culpability of the government in the successful
Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor.2 Clearly, vital facts were withheld, and
the people were never told the whole truth about Pearl Harbor. Again,
in 1970, the House of Representatives debated whether or not a federal
district court had the right, as a result of its ruling in Hentoiff v. Ichord a
to enjoin the printing and publication of an Internal Security Committee
report (No. 91-1607) dealing with the financing of several revolution-
ary organizations by honoraria paid campus speakers. Fortunately, the
House, asserting its will, passed a resolution ordering the printing of
* Member, Illinois Bar, Indiana Bar; L.L.B., J.D. John Marshall Law School;
Chairman, World Habeas Corpus Committee; President, Commission for Inter-
national Due Process of Law; Congressional Nominee for 1972 Nobel Peace Prize.
1 Ervin, Secrecy in a Free Society, THE NATION, Nov. 8, 1971, at 454 [hereinafter
Ervin].
2 See Krock, Pearl Harbor Echoes, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1944, at 8, col. 3.
3 318 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1970).
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the report and itself enjoined any person
from interfering with the publication.
4
I
Perhaps the best place to begin this
examination of the right to know is with the
alleged power of the President to invoke
"executive privilege", whereby he can with-
hold information from the Congress, and
the public, as well. This situation gives rise
to conflict in the executive's refusal to
divulge information to the Congress which
he feels might impede him in performing
his own constitutional responsibilities vis-d-
vis the right of Congress to obtain informa-
tion vital to its legislative function in the
decision-making process. Also involved
here is the basic right of the public to know
what the government is doing.'
The Founding Fathers envisioned the
principle of "accountability" within the
Constitution, and they fully understood that
governmental responsibility had to be
shared.' The President, judges, and mem-
bers of Congress were accountable to the
people for their own official public actions
and they would be held ultimately responsi-
ble. 7 Still, the Founders were aware that
each branch must respect the duties and
prerogatives of the other branches, for
the purpose of the doctrine of separation of
powers which they had fashioned over 200
years ago was to prevent any undue con-
centration of power in any one branch of
4 H.R. Res. 1306, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116
CONG. REC. 41355, 41374 (1970).
5 Ervin, supra note 1, at 454-55.
, Id. at 454, 456.
7 Rogers, The Right to Know Government Busi-
ness from the Viewpoint of the Governiment Of-
ficial, 40 MARQ. L. REv. 83, 85 (1956).
government. 8 Madison commented on these
conflicting principles when he wrote in the
Federalist Papers (No. 48):
After discriminating, therefore, in the-
ory, the several classes of power, as they
may in their nature be legislative, execu-
tive or judiciary, the next and most diffi-
cult task is to provide some practical se-
curity for each .... 
Indeed, the conflict between the branches
over this issue is as old as the Union itself.
When the legislative branch undertook an
investigation of the St. Clair Expedition
during the first administration of George
Washington, the President did not question
"that the House . . .might institute in-
quiries" and "that it might call for papers
generally"-but while he noted "that the
Executive ought to communicate such
papers as the public good would permit,"
he contended that the executive also had
the discretion "to refuse ... (information),
the disclosure of which would injure the
public." 10 With "a just regard to the Con-
stitution and to the duty of [his] office,"
President Washington further set down his
reasons for refusing to comply with the
House's request to furnish it with the docu-
ments in this case on the ground that
it is essential to the due administration of
the Government that the boundaries fixed
by the Constitution between the different
departments should be preserved. .... 11
In the end, nevertheless, all the St. Clair
documents were turned over to the House.' 2
8 Ervin, supra note 1, at 456-57.
9 Id. at 457.
10 Id. at 454.
11 1 J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
THE PRESIDENTS 196 (1899).
12 Ervin, supra note 1, at 454.
That Congress has the power to "institute
inquiries," as accepted by Washington, and
to "exact evidence," has been sufficiently
supported in the past."3 Said the court in
McGrain v. Daugherty,14 "The power to
legislate carries with it by necessary impli-
cation ample authority to obtain informa-
tion needed in the rightful exercise of that
power and to employ compulsory process
for the purpose. . . ." Though there is noth-
ing in the Constitution relating to the exis-
tence of executive privilege,' 5 this privilege
against disclosure of certain confidential
papers under given circumstances in the
decision-making process has been ascribed
to the principle of separation of powers.' 6
The purpose for this principle, as explained
by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissent in
Myers v. United States, was "by means of
the inevitable friction incident to the dis-
tribution of the governmental powers among
three departments, to save the people from
autocracy."' 7
And, on the basis of additional state-
ments in Myers-that "the President alone
and unaided could not execute the
laws . . . ," therefore requiring "the assis-
tance of subordinates"'s-"the alleged au-
thority [of the President] to exercise
executive privilege has been extended to
the entire executive branch."' 9 But, regard-
less of whether the advice the President
receives and acts upon is good or bad, there
13 Id.
14 273 U.S. 135, 165 (1927).
15 Ervin, supra note 1, at 455.
16 Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1081 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (Wilkey, J., concurring).
17 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926).
18 Id. at 117.
19 Ervin, supra note 1, at 455.
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can be no shifting of responsibility to sub-
ordinates. 20 Though President Kennedy
initiated the basic policy, since reaffirmed
by Presidents Johnson and Nixon, that the
President would have the ultimate decision
and responsibility in the invoking of execu-
tive privilege, practice has not always fol-
lowed the theory.2 '
The claim that the exercise of executive
privilege is an "inherent power" of the
President if the executive branch is to have
the autonomy necessary to properly dis-
charge its duties has been supported by the
allegation that said power derives from the
duty imposed on the President under Sec-
tion 3 of Article II of the Constitution:
that he take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. Yet, this so called power has
been merely assumed, since there is neither
constitutional grant, nor statutory authority,
providing authority for it.22
While it is expected that the Chief Execu-
tive assume and display a certain amount
of initiative through the wielding of his
administrative power, the President can
exercise no power which cannot reasonably
be traced to either the Constitution or an
act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof.
Hence, any power not granted the Presi-
dent by a constitutional or statutory pro-
vision does not exist. The field of action
within which he may operate is plainly
marked for him-if in general terms so as
not to embarrass him in the wide possible
range of policy outlined. Constitutional
limits imposing such restraints on the exer-
20 See Rogers, supra note 7, at 89.
21 Ervin, supra note 1, at 455.
22 i.
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
cise of governmental power have prevented
our democracy from destroying itself.
Through his increasing power, as with
Executive Orders, the President, however,
has been able to act without the restraints
of congressional authorization which pro-
vide for effective legislative oversight,
thereby eroding the principle of separation
of governmental powers. For example, in
1952 President Truman seized the steel
plants by Executive Order. The Supreme
Court, very shortly thereafter, invalidated
that act as unconstitutional in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.2:  The several
majority opinions delivered in the Steel
Seizure Case "indicated that Congress is a
co-equal branch [whose] prerogatives may
not be usurped or impeded" by executive
actions.2 4 Certainly, the President cannot
increase his powers by such proclamations
in order to raise his position of power to
one that did not previously exist. If that
were not the case, there would be nothing
left to those limitations largely imposed by
the Constitution.
Senator Sam Ervin, chairman of the
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers,
held hearings on executive privilege and
found this assumed power has been in-
voked in a number of instances throughout
the history of the nation. Expressing a
concern for separated but balanced power,
Senator Ervin has viewed with alarm the
steady increase of executive power-re-
suiting from the failure of Congress to
assert its own power to prevent the execu-
tive branch from withholding information
23 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
24 Ervin, supra note 1, at 455.
at its own sole discretion-because all this
"has come close to creating a 'government
of men, not of laws.'" Ervin specifically
concludes that the practice of executive
privilege "clearly contravenes the basic
principle that the free flow of ideas and
information, and the open and full disclo-
sure of the governing process, are essential
to the operation of a free society. ' '25
II
Congress responded to the "persistent
problem of legislators and citizens . ..of
obtaining adequate information to evaluate
federal programs and formulate wise poli-
cies. . . . [Recognizing] that the public
cannot make intelligent decisions without
such information, and that governmental
institutions become unresponsive to public
needs if knowledge of their activities is
denied to the people and their representa-
tives,' '2 6 Congress passed the Freedom of
Information Act, which went into effect on
July 4, 1967.27
The express purpose of the new Act (the
FOIA) was to expand to the greatest prac-
tical extent the full disclosure of govern-
ment actions to the public.2 8 This "public
access to governmental records [was in-
creased] by substituting limited categories
of privileged material for discretionary
standards and [by] providing an effective
judicial remedy [under the Act, in which]
. . . the usual principle of deference to
administrative determinations [is rejected
25 Id.
26 448 F.2d at 1080.
27 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1970) [hereinafter Act].
28 Ervin, supra note 1, at 455.
in favor of a required] trial de novo in the
district court."'29
Clearly, the legislative intent of the FOIA
was to assure public access to all govern-
ment records whose disclosure would not
significantly harm specific governmental
interests. The Act, in attempting to strike
a balance between the public interest in
the freedom of information and the public
and private interests in secrecy, sets down
nine specific exemptions to the general
requirements of disclosure-and "expressly
limits the grounds for non-disclosure to
those specified."'30 While the disclosure re-
quirements are to be construed broadly,
the exemptions are narrowly interpreted,
and many seek to encourage individuals to
communicate certain kinds of information
to the government on a confidential basisY.3
Among the exemptions, the first is re-
lated to matters "specifically required by
Executive Order to be kept secret in the
interest of the national defense or foreign
policy. '32 The second exemption protects
the "internal personnel rules and practices
of an agency, '33 and the third precludes
the disclosure of information "specifically
exempted from disclosure by statute. '3 4
The fourth protects "trade secrets and com-
mercial or financial information obtained
from a person and privileged or confiden-
tial.13 5 Other such exemptions include
"personnel and medical files and similar
files the disclosure of which would con-
2) 448 F.2d at 1076-77.
30 Id. at 1077.
31 448 F.2d at 1078.
32 Act, supra note 27, at (b) (I).
,3 Id. at (b)(2).
:;4 Id. at (b) (3).
35 Id. at (b)(4).
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stitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy, '36 as well as matters
"contained in or related to examination,
operating or condition reports prepared by,
on behalf of, or for the use of an agency
responsible for the regulation or supervision
of financial institutions.137 Also exempted
are "investigatory files compiled for law
enforcement purposes [both civil and crim-
inal] except to the extent available by law
to a party other than an agency." '38
The fifth exemption "intended to encour-
age the free exchange of ideas during the
process of deliberation and policy-mak-
ing," 39 by exempting the disclosure of "inter-
agency and intra-agency memorandums or
letters which would not be available by law
to a party other than an agency in litigation
with the agency."'40 This section covers
most, if not all, of the information protected
by the common law privilege against public
disclosure: "that public officials are en-
titled to the private advice of their subordi-
nates and to confer among themselves
freely and frankly without fear of disclo-
sure. "41
Given all nine exemptions, though, none
of them constitute "authority to withhold
information from the Congress," as Sec-
tion (4) (c) of the FOIA specifically
states.
42
Aside from the matter of the Garwin Re-
port, 43 several other suits have been brought
36 Id. at (b)(6).
37 id. at (b)(8).
38 Id. at (b)(7).
39 448 F.2d at 1077.
40 Act, supra note 27, at (b)(5).
41 448 F.2d at 1080-81 (Wilkey, J., concurring).
42 Ervin, supra note 1, at 455.
43 See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
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under the FOIA. One particularly relevant
to the disclosure of information not ex-
empted under the Act is Consumers Union
v. Veteran's Administration.4 4 The action
arose out of the repeated attempts by Con-
sumers Union of the United States, Inc.
(CU), the non-profit organization which
publishes evaluations of consumer products
in its monthly Consumer Reports, to secure
release of raw test scores and the scoring
scheme and quality points used by the Vet-
erans Administration (VA) to determine
which brands of hearing aids for veterans
qualified for that agency's annual purchas-
ing. CU had finally sued the VA to compel
the disclosure of the data. In its holding, the
court rejected the VA's claim that the
FOIA exemptions (specifically the second
through the fifth) permitted the agency to
refuse disclosure, and found the exemptions
to be inapplicable in this case. The court
added that when data is not thus exempted
from disclosure under the Act, the court
itself has judicial discretion to either with-
hold a remedy or grant an injunction com-
pelling disclosure if an agency refuses to
disclose non-exempt data.45
The court decided it "must, according to
traditional equity principles, weigh the ef-
fects of disclosure ... and determine the
best course to follow at the present time."
46
Support for this was found in Hecht Co. v.
44 301 F. Supp. 796, (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal
dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
45 See Comment, Freedom of Information-
Court May Permit Withholding of Information
Not Exempted From Disclosure Under Freedom
of Information Act, 5 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv.
Lm. L. REV. 121-23 (1970) [hereinafter Com-
ment].
46 301 F. Supp. at 806.
Bowles,47 where the Supreme Court ruled
that the District Court did not have to grant
an injunction, as the Emergency Price
Control Act directed on complaint of the
administrator of the Office of Price Ad-
ministration, if equitable considerations so
indicated. In further extending Hecht to
Consumers Union, the court would exer-
cise its discretion to uphold an agency's
refusal to disclose data only for those
clearest equitable considerations for which
Congress did not establish standards for
exemptions under the FOIA.48
Because the Act places the burden of
proof on the agency seeking to prevent
disclosure,49 the court held in Consumers
Union that it
must order ... disclosure unless the agency
proves that disclosure will result in signifi-
cantly greater harm than good. 50
So while the court agreed to compel the
disclosure of the raw test scores, it none-
theless felt that the VA had met the bur-
den of proof relative to the scoring scheme
and quality points, 51 for, in the court's
opinion, the "release of the scoring
scheme would result in manufacturers de-
signing and submitting hearing aids that
would score well in the VA tests." Thus,
the court was led to find that while "[r]e-
leasing the scoring scheme would help other
laboratories" (such as the plaintiff) in
"their own testing programs .... this bene-
fit is outweighed by the disruption of [gov-
47 321 U.S. 321, 328 (1944).
48 Comment, supra note 45, at 132.
49 Act, supra note 27, at (a)(3).
50 301 F. Supp. at 806.
51 Id. at 807-08.
ernment testing] programs. '52 In sum, the
effect of this decision was "to shift discre-
tionary authority to withhold information
under the FOIA from the administrative
agency to the judiciary." 53
Another important case based on the
FOIA was Epstein v. Resor,54 the first test
case concerning the Act to be taken to the
Supreme Court of the United States. At
issue was the historic problem dealt with
in this paper: the public's right to know
versus national security. 55
In this case the appellant, an historian
and research associate at Stanford Uni-
versity's Hoover Institution on War, Revo-
lution and Peace, had, since 1954, un-
successfully sought the release of a United
States Army file to review for his historic
research. The file, "Operation Keelhaul,"
dealing with the forced repatriation of
Soviet nationals from German prison camps
during and after World War II, was classi-
fied "top secret" under an executive order
protecting government records classified in
the interest of national security or foreign
policy.5 6 The plaintiff had an interest in
immigration and refugee problems-in
1959, under the Eisenhower Administra-
tion, he had been appointed a member of
the White House Conference on Refugees
-and he was now preparing a book on this
subject of forced repatriation. He estimated
"that between 2 and 5 million people in
52 Id. at 808.
53 Comment, supra note 45, at 132.
54 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 965 (1970).
55 116 CONG. REc. 36712 (1970) (remarks of
Rep. Ashbrook).
56 Id.
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prison camps in Germany, Britain, Canada,
and the United States were forcibly shipped
back to the Soviet Union against their
wishes." 57
Epstein contended in his suit that the
file on Operation Keelhaul was over 20
years old and, therefore, the restriction as
to national security or foreign policy
seemed rather absurd. Arguing from the
FOIA's specification that various classifica-
tions of information could not be withheld
from the public, Epstein also maintained
that it was the intent of Congress under the
Act that a United States district court
would review the file and make a judgment
as to whether it was properly classified.
The courts ruled otherwise, however. Still,
the importance of the case lies in its
bringing into question the workability of
the FOIA, as now constructed. It must be
determined whether amendments are neces-
sary to clarify the intent of Congress with
respect to this act and enhance its utility, or
if other changes are needed to protect both
the interest of the nation's security and
the availability of government information
to which the public is entitled.5 8 In this
vein, Congressman Ogden R. Reid of New
York has suggested that the FOIA be
tightened by (1) sharply limiting the types
of information now permitted to be with-
held, and (2) reducing from the present 60
57 Id. at 36711.
58 Id. see Briefs, memoranda and opinions in
Epstein v. Resor, reprinted at 36713-14. See also
116 CONG. REc. 25505-06 (1970) (remarks of
Rep. Ashbrook); 116 CONG. Rae. 33720-25
(1970) (remarks of Rep. Pucinski); 116 CONG.
REC. 34487-92 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Pucin-
ski).
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days the time permitting the government to
respond to a court suit. 59
m
When it comes to federal or state legisla-
tion to loosen or tighten government in-
formation procedures, the Freedom of
Information Center at the University of
Missouri School of Journalism in Columbia
has been a strong advocate of the right to
know. Though relatively little-known, the
center is believed to be the world's largest
clearing-house for information on the pub-
lic's right to know, but it does more than
merely process requests for information
and guidance. In addition to the research
role and the publication of reports on right-
to-know issues, the center's efforts in behalf
of the news media and against secrecy-
such as its fight to defeat a Senate bill re-
stricting the release of pre-verdict informa-
tion in criminal cases-have been recog-
nized by Senate civil libertarian Sam Ervin,
as a "valuable contribution" to that body's
information studies. The Freedom of In-
formation Center was founded in 1959 by
24 representatives of newspapers, broad-
casting operations and other interested
groups. The idea behind the center can be
found in the summation of Herbert
Brucker of the Hartford Courant: "Today's
struggle for the right to know is but another
battle in the historic war for freedom of the
press .....- 60
A free press was rooted "in the openness
59 Reid, Free Press, Free People, N.Y. Times,
July 13, 1971, at 33, col. 3.
60 As quoted in Stein, Missouri's Freedom of
Information Center, SATURDAY REV., Mar. 13,
1971, at 93.
of the Athenian democracy and in the
principle of public accountability," 61 but
that long, bitter struggle to establish and
preserve freedom of the press has been a
part of Anglo-American history as kings
and parliaments attempted to control the
press by a licensing system for the printing
of material. Later, in 17th and 18th century
England, the common law crime of sedi-
tious libel emerged as a new means of
control and there were hundreds of con-
victions under it.62 Seditious libel was
defined in England by Chief Justice Holt
in the Tuchin's case of 1704 when he wrote
that
[a] reflection on the government must be
punished, because if people should not be
called to account for possessing the people
with an ill opinion of the government, no
government can subsist. For it is very nec-
essary for all governments that the people
should have a good opinion of it.63
The great Blackstone commented,
"Every freeman has an undoubted right to
lay what sentiments he pleases before the
public ...but if he publishes what is im-
proper, mischievous or illegal, he must
take [the] consequences of his own temer-
ity."'64 Albeit a reasonable statement, Al-
61 Little, The Press in War and Peace, SATURDAY
REV., Mar. 13, 1971, at 99.
62 117 CONG. REC. S15817 (daily ed. Oct. 5,
1971) (opening statement of Senator Ervin be-
fore the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee
Hearings on Freedom of the Press) [hereinafter
Statement].
63 Id. See also 117 CONG. REC. E6393 (daily ed.
June 23, 1971) (reprint of lecture by Professor
Alfred C. Emery) [hereinafter Emery].
64 Quoted in Schweid, Would High Court Uphold
N.Y. Times?, Chicago Sun-Times, June 17, 1971,
at 6.
fred C. Emery, president of the University
of Utah, perceives a danger in that rule
because "there are few or no limits" to the
term "illegal." In Blackstone's words that
"seditious or scandalous libels are punished
by the English law ... for the preservation
of . . . a government . . . ." or that "the
disseminating, or making public, of bad
sentiments, destructive of the ends of
society, is the crime which society corrects,"
Professor Emery finds license for the state
"to prosecute anything it finds threatening
to its policies or even inconvenient."
Further, given Blackstone's remark that
freedom of the press did not mean "free-
dom from censure," Emery concludes that
the effect of all this "is to so chill the exer-
cise of free speech by the threat of criminal
prosecution that there is no freedom at
all." 6 5
The climate of freedom in colonial
America was no greater, the law of sedi-
tious libel being enforced with equal vigor.
Indeed, the issue of freedom of the press
was one of the major grievances that led to
the American Revolution. Of the many
cases involving this issue, the one to have
the greatest lasting significance was, of
course, the Zenger trial. 66 The verdict in
this 1735 case was to establish the principle
of freedom of publication in America.
Briefly, John Peter Zenger, an editor-
printer, was opposed to the policies of the
colonial governor of New York; 67 in his
weekly newspaper, the Journal, Zenger
65 Emery, supra note 63, at E6391-92.
66 Id. at E6393.
67 Tobin, Free to Speak, Free to Publish, SATUR-
DAY REV., Apr. 11, 1970, at 54 [hereinafter
Tobin].
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published a series of articles accusing
Governor Cosby of tyranny.68 Zenger was
forthwith arrested for seditious libel and
jailed; but, "following a trial by jury that
gained world-wide attention, Zenger was
acquitted." '69 The jury, in finding Zenger
not guilty, followed the urgings of the New
York printer's attorney, Andrew Hamilton,
by determining whether the statements of
Zenger were libelous and providing truth
as a defense-a precedent later adopted in
some state constitutions.7 0
The Constitutional Convention, meeting
in 1787, did not sufficiently detail the free-
doms of speech and press so as to allay
popular dissatisfaction. Madison was
promptly enlisted to draft a number of
amendments to the Constitution.7 1 Madison
had expressed in the Federalist the concern
of the people that the tyranny of a majority
was just as destructive to freedom as was
the tyranny of kings. 72 In effect, no major-
ity, no matter how great, should deprive a
minority, no matter how small, of certain
fundamental rights.
Ten of the dozen amendments which
Madison drafted were then adopted by the
first Congress in 1791 as the Bill of Rights.
These ten amendments, dealing with the
fundamental political rights of every man,
began with freedom of speech and press
"designed . . . to insure an unlimited ex-
change of ideas in a context of free expres-
sion."'73 Under the first amendment, the
68 Emery, supra note 63.
69 See Tobin, supra note 67.
70 Emery, supra note 63.
71 See Tobin, supra note 67.
72 Emery, supra note 63.
73 See Tobin, supra note 67, at 53-54.
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f :edom of the press was removed from
sphere of government in strong lan-
guage prohibiting any interference by Con-
gress: "Congress shall make no laws . . .
abridging the freedom of speech or of the
press." The creation of this amendment was
a response to the past experience of those
who had conceived and ratified it. They had
been oppressed, as previously stated, and
knew the anger and frustration aroused by
the suppression of opinion and expression
through the threat of criminal prosecu-
tion.7 4 Incorporated into this amendment
was the sentiment expressed by Thomas
Jefferson at the birth of the Republic:
No government ought to be without
censors and where the press is free, no
one ever will. 75
Nevertheless, there are exceptions to the
rule of totally free expression, and even in
a democracy there cannot be complete free-
dom at all times. To be sure, this means
that freedom to publish is not always an
absolute under all circumstances. It is cer-
tainly a reasonable restriction in time of
war to censor press reports in order to pre-
vent the giving of aid to the enemy by
exposing military secrets. 76 In wartime
the minds of men are confused and diverted
to the needs of the moment. Government
regulation is indefinitely extended in time
of war because the situation requires cer-
tain controls to which everybody must sub-
mit-and which the people recognize when
they surrender their rights. Still, the censor-
ship imposed on the press by the govern-
74 Emery, supra note 63.
75 Statement, supra note 62.
76 See Tobin, supra note 67, at 53.
ment in completely suppressing a great deal
of news relating directly to the Laos ad-
venture was far more complete than seemed
necessary for any legitimate war purpose.
Many facts had been censored which would
have done the enemy no good. Regardless
of the success of the military expedition,
the government had shown a surprisingly
reckless regard for freedom of the press.
Indeed, the mishandling of the press dur-
ing the United States' excursion into Laos
led to formal protests from several groups
of correspondents who criticized the avail-
ability of information. While restrictions on
wartime news coverage are nothing new,
there was concern over whether the news
restriction in the Laos campaign was a de-
parture from the now-established journalis-
tic tradition of U.S. war coverage. The
Freedom of Information Committee of
Sigma Delta Chi, the national professional
journalism society, felt basic principles
were at stake in Laos, and they issued a
strongly-worded statement critical of "the
excessively prolonged limitations which the
U.S. government imposed on press, radio,
and television coverage of an operation in
which so many Americans had deep inter-
est and concern. '7 7 The statement con-
tinued, recognizing that
[allthough the embargo on reporting of the
Laos operation may have been initially nec-
essary in the interest of protecting our
forces and those of our allies, extending
the blackout well past the point when the
operation had been reported by foreign
news agencies, including those of North
77 Tobin, The Right to Know, SATURDAY REV.
Apr. 10, 1971, at 41-42.
Vietnam and Communist China, rendered
it ridiculous.78
Further acts of censorship, according to the
Freedom of Information Committee, were
"the early prohibition of correspondents
from riding in American aircraft participat-
ing in the Laos operation . . . [and] the
order prohibiting U.S. helicopter pilots re-
turning from missions over Laos from talk-
ing with correspondents. ' '79
The freedom of institutions (particularly
the press, radio and television) through
which free expression reaches the people
of the United States is essential to their
freedom of speech. If speech is to be free,
there must be freedom of every possible
means of communicating ideas, views, prin-
ciples, and hopes from one citizen to an-
other, and from one section of the country
to another. Only by free means of com-
munications can people remain free. There
is no more fundamental liberty, for if free-
dom of speech and press is destroyed, every
other freedom can be whittled away with-
out the realization that it is being done.
That is the goal of creating an arbitrary
government. But free speech does not mean
that those in control of government shall
alone have the right and means to speak.
Whenever news is suppressed (as in the
Laos adventure) all comment on it is auto-
matically destroyed and it amounts to a
denial of freedom of speech.
Out of the Laotion effort emerged the
immediate issue of freedom of the broad-
cast press, which is the only federally li-
censed medium of journalism. In its own
78 Id. at 41.
79 Id. at 41-42.
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way, that particular freedom is just as im-
portant as the war in South East Asia,80
where, hopefully, a victory will contribute
to the establishment of freedom of expres-
sion.
There has been such an ingrained insis-
tence on the freedom of the press in this
country that any great attempt to actually
suppress that freedom has been prevented
(note, for example, the early repeal of the
Sedition Act, which Congress had passed
in 1789 to punish by fine and imprison-
ment "any false, scandalous and malicious
writing" published against the government,
Congress, or President). Si Today anyone
who has a real message can find publica-
tions covering every shade of opinion to
print it. But, whereas there is as yet no
federal agency in control of newspapers,
nor any federal bureau which licenses the
press, this is not true of the broadcast
media which as a means of communication
and a facility of free speech, is an equally
important instrument of free speech along
with the press.
By its very nature, the broadcast media
must be regulated in a manner not nec-
essary in the case of publications. Unlike
the situation of newspapers, it is essential
that stations be confined to specific wave
lengths, and powers, so that they might not
conflict with each other. In order to pre-
vent confusion in the airwaves by a flood
of voices which would exist in broadcast-
ing-thus rendering the medium useless-
sans some regulations, the Communications
Act was passed in 1934. Yet, as is so often
80 117 CONG. REC. S4893-94 (daily ed. Apr. 15,
1971) (remarks by Senator Symington).
81 Statement, supra note 62, at S15818.
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the case with government control, this lim-
ited authority has increased under the Fed-
eral Communications Commission to such
a point that many broadcasters fear the
principles of a free press relative to broad-
casting no longer have any significance.
8 2
The fact that broadcasting is the only me-
dium of journalism that is licensed by the
government makes it subject to special re-
straint. These licenses to broadcast come
up every three years for review or renewal
-the latter depending on the judgement of
the FCC as to how each broadcaster has
performed in "the public interest." If the
commission has the authority to grant or
deny a license, it has the power to judge a
news medium-and that power can have
an impact on what is broadcast. In that
way, this subordinate agency of the govern-
ment could pressure the broadcast media
into presenting only those views of events
with which the government agrees, instead
of the information to which the public is en-
titled, thereby prejudicing the very function
the press is supposed to have in our society:
to serve, in the words of Mr. Justice Suther-
land, "as one of the greatest interpreters
between men and government and the peo-
ple."'s3 While the airwaves should prevent
confusion, have decent expression and af-
ford facilities to all points of view, unlim-
ited government regulation of broadcasting
could foreshadow the end of a free broad-
cast media by presenting a most serious
infringement on first amendment rights.
The dangers inherent in leaving to a few
government officials the power to decide
what can or cannot be discussed is a part
82 Id.
83 See note 80 supra at S4893.
of the major problem involved in authoriz-
ing government regulation of broadcasting
"in the public interest" while protecting the
freedom of the press, as well. 4
It should be pointed out, in passing, that
the media is not immune from criticism,
and some of it has come from those within
the journalism profession itself.8 5 Within
the right of the people to know there is a
role of responsibility, as well as a right of
free press, in the coverage of public affairs.
Journalism's own standards of professional
behavior are established in the Code of
Ethics of the American Society of News-
paper Editors. The code states that the
"opportunities" of journalism "as a chroni-
cle are indissolubly linked (to) its obliga-
tions as teacher and interpreter"; it adds, in
part, "... a journalist who uses his power
for any selfish or otherwise unworthy pur-
pose is faithless to a high trust."86 One
particular problem here is the case of a
re-write man who can infringe on individual
freedom even when the original reporting
is responsible. As in the spirit of the initial
Agnew attack on the media, simply put,
it is for a vigilant and vocal citizenry to
provide adequate protection against the po-
tential misuse of vast powers of influence
possessed by public information media.
Certainly no consideration of the princi-
ples of a free press as it relates to the right
to know is complete without a discussion of
the United States v. New York Times Co.,8 7
84 Statement, supra note 62, at S15819.
85 See note 80 supra at S4894.
86 117 CONG. REC. H6371 (daily ed., July 6,
1971) (remarks by Mr. Ichord).
87 328 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 444 F.2d
544 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
in which the government attempted through
the federal courts to restrain publication by
the New York Times (and the Washington
Post) of the now-famous Pentagon Papers
which contained classified information con-
cerning the country's involvement in the
Vietnam war. It was the first time since
the adoption of the Bill of Rights that the
courts had been asked by the government
to halt the publication of an article.
In the Times case, the government and
the press put forth conflicting positions,
with the basis of the government's argu-
ment being that the "inherent" presidential
power to protect the national interest was
superior to the protections of the first
amendment. Thus, the government felt that
it was entitled to an injunction against pub-
lication on the grounds of "the President's
constitutional responsibility for foreign af-
fairs and for national security;"88 publica-
tion, charged the government, "seriously
interfered with the conduct of our foreign
relations," 9 and it "urged the courts to
establish a standard 'allowing' the govern-
ment to prevent" the revelation of such
material that could do "great and irrepara-
ble harm to the nation's security." 90
As for the New York Times, it main-
tained that the reason the material was
published originally was its belief "that it
is in the interest of the people of this coun-
try to be informed. . ".."91 The paper sub-
sequently added in a later editorial:
... but, even more emphatically, it would
88 Statement, supra note 62, at S15818.
89 CHICAGO TODAY, June 16, 1971, at 45.
90 TIME, July 5, 1971, at 13.
91 See note 89 supra at 13.
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have been an abrogation of responsibility
and a renunciation of our obligations under
the First Amendment not to have published
it.
It is the effort to expose and elucidate
(the) truth that is the very essence of free-
dom of the press. 92
The Times invoked the argument of
"prior restraint", the practice of which
would mean "that the public's right to
know and the First Amendment guarantee
of press freedom ruled out pre-publication
censorship."93 Still the definite word on the
legal weapon of prior restraint was the one
delivered by Chief Justice Hughes in Near
v. Minnesota94 in 1931. Noting that sup-
pression of publication "is of the essence
of censorship," Hughes wrote on the guar-
anty of freedom of the press: "[I]t has
been generally, if not universally, consid-
ered that it is the chief purpose . . . to
prevent previous restraints upon publica-
tion."95 Hughes, in speaking for the major-
ity in this 1931 case where the court (by
a 5-to-4 decision) barred prosecution of
an anti-Semitic paper which claimed that
Minneapolis officials were in league with
a Jewish gangster, also reiterated: "[L]ib-
erty of the press, historically considered and
taken up by the Federal Constitution, has
meant, principally although not exclusively,
immunity from previous restraints or cen-
sorship." 96 Even so, Hughes left a loophole
open by adding that the ban on prior re-
straint "is not absolutely limited," as in
92 Id.
93 See note 90 supra.
94 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
95 283 U.S. at 713.
96 Id. at 716.
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time of war, for instance, relative to "the
publication of the sailing dates of trans-
ports . . . ," or the likeY7
In an historic precedent in the Times
case, Federal District Court Judge Murray
I. Gurfein at first temporarily blocked the
newspaper from continuing the series on
the Pentagon Papers.98 Upon issuing the
restraining order, the judge had stated that
the questions involved here were "serious
and fundamental" to the very heart of the
government-free press relationship.99 It
was his view that "a free and independent
press ought to be willing to sit down with
the Department of Justice and screen these
documents that you have . . ." as a matter
"of simple patriotism to determine whether
the publication of any of them is or is not
dangerous to the national security."'100
However, after the hearings, Judge Gurfein
finally concluded that the government had
not proven its case, thus leaving the Times
free to resume publication of the docu-
ments.101
In handing down his decision, Gurfein
wrote:
A cantankerous press, an obstinate press,
a ubiquitous press must be suffered by
those in authority in order to preserve the
even greater values of freedom of expres-
sion and the right of the people to know.'
0 2
The Supreme Court had to resolve the
battle in the end. 10 3 The decision in New
Id.
328 F. Supp. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Id. at 325.
NEWSWEEK, June 28, 1971, at 27.
328 F. Supp. at 331.
Id.
See note 90 supra.
York Times Co. v. United States'0 4 was a
landmark in analyzing the state of law
concerning freedom of the press. In this
most important ruling of June 30, 1971,
the Court rejected the government's appli-
cation for an injunction and reaffirmed the
belief, as emphasized by Mr. Justice Black,
that "the Founding Father's gave the free
press the protection (from government con-
trol) it must have to fulfill its essential role
in our democracy." 0 5 Quoting further from
Black's opinion in the case:
The press was to serve the governed, not
the governors. The Government's power to
censor the press was abolished so that the
press would remain forever free to censure
the Government. 106
A postscript to this case was provided
on December 7, 1971, when Federal Dis-
trict Judge Gerhard A. Gesell denied a suit
by Congressmen Reid of New York and
Moss of California asking the court to
examine the still classified segments of the
Pentagon Papers in secret session and then
decide whether all or part should be re-
leased. Judge Gesell, who had ruled against
the government when it had sought to re-
strain the Washington Post from publishing
articles based on the Pentagon Papers, held
a court review of the material in question
to be undesirable, since "[i]t is entirely
foreign to our traditions to place papers in
the hands of a judge for his private ex parte
inspection, excluding them from the eyes
of the litigants." He added: "The determi-
nation of the interests of national defense
104 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
105 Id. at 717.
106 Id.
or foreign policy cannot be made by ap-
plying some simple litmus test to a docu-
ment presented. '107
IV
The whole matter of the Pentagon Papers
also involves the classification system, "a
more generalized attempt" than executive
privilege to withhold data which may be
of "potential interest to the public"-
thereby preventing any meaningful use of
that information.' 0 8 Such information cut-
off from the public and press through the
government's practice of routinely stamping
much material as "secret" may later be
revealed at a more convenient time or cal-
culated to be leaked out whenever the gov-
ernment wants to get a point across. 10 9
President Eisenhower endeavored to
straighten out the chaos of classification,
spawned by America's rise as a world
power before and during World War II
and heightened by the advent of the cold
war. In 1953 the President issued an execu-
tive order breaking down classification into
three categories-top secret, secret, and
confidential-still in use today (although
Executive Order No. 10501,110 on forbid-
ding or restricting the disclosure of classi-
fied information on defense matters whose
release might injure, or embarrass the na-
107 N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1971, at 16, col. 1. It
is also interesting to note that it was Judge Gesell
who entered a final order permanently enjoining
the printing and distribution of the Internal Se-
curity Committee report in Hentoff v. Ichord,
318 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1970).
108 Ervin, supra note 1, at 455-56.
109 TIME, July 5, 1971, at 14-15.
110 3 C.F.R. 292 (1971). See also TIME, July 5,
1971, at 14.
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tional defense or foreign relations, was
somewhat amended by Mr. Eisenhower
himself in Executive Order No. 10816, and
by President Kennedy in Executive Order
No. 10964111). However, according to
William G. Florence, an ex-classifier for
the Defense Department, in his testimony
before the House Foreign Operations &
Government Information Subcommittee,
the Eisenhower executive order led to a
"mass of weird confusion." The top secret
classification was intended to cover critical
military or defense plans or secret techno-
logical developments whose disclosure
would result in "exceptionally grave dam-
age to the nation," that is, be of use to the
enemy. Yet, much dubious material was
labeled top secret, including all but one of
the volumes of the Pentagon Papers. Cer-
tainly, all the furor created by those docu-
ments is likely to curtail the license of
Washington bureaucrats to label almost
anything as secret so the government can
avoid bad publicity. 112
In commenting on the publication of the
Pentagon report during a television inter-
view, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk
-though he said his sole regret over the
publication was "because of the great im-
portance of protecting the ability of the
United States to talk privately with other
governments ... if we lose that chance then
we are in great trouble"-did admit, none-
theless, that "there are a lot of things in
the Government that are overclassified, and
many of them remain classified far too
long. ' 1 3 He explained:
III Ervin, supra note 1, at 455.
112 See note 109 supra.
113 N.Y. Times, July 14, 1971, at 35, col. 3.
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One of the problems is if you declassify
only a part of the story then you are putting
out only a part of the story, and in these
diplomatic transactions we usually wait for
a period of about 20 years before we make
all this correspondence public. 114
Still, the State Department has only gotten
up to 1941 in its de-classification program,
and if anyone wishes to look at the records
later than this he must get a security clear-
ance and submit all the notes he takes for
inspection. 115
Of course, the executive branch is privy
to a great deal of information that the other
branches do not have-nor, in some cases,
should have; and the President is surely not
going to consult with his opponents or
critics in advance on every decision. Rusk
has commented that "in a democratic soci-
ety the public does have a right to know,
but the public also has a right to have its
public business transacted in a responsible
fashion. . .. "116 But, in the wake of the
Pentagon Papers,"7 policies determined in
secret-sans full and free discussion to
safeguard against fatal errors-in a pos-
sible attempt to cover up faults or failures,
could commit the nation to dangerous and
disasterous obligations.
Congressman Reid of New York has
been among those who have denounced the
"unilateral executive decision making" of
the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations
on Vietnam and the concerted attempts by
the Nixon Administration to prevent that
114 Id.
115 See note 109 supra at 14.
'11, See note 113 supra.
117 NEWSWEEK, June 28, 1971, at 12-15.
past history from reaching the Congress.
Reid has proposed a remedy by calling
upon Congress to adopt a law governing
classified documents, which would limit
what would be labeled secret and provide
for automatic de-classification and congres-
sional oversight. Should a matter remain
secret after a stated period, then Reid sug-
gested that "there should be an affirmative,
positive finding as to why continued secrecy
is necessary." Further, whenever material
is improperly classified by the executive
simply to avoid governmental embarrass-
ment, contrary to the proposal, the Con-
gress would have the right to make it
public. Finally, and uppermost in Reid's
mind, is the vast reduction in the 8,000
officers in the Defense Department with
authority to designate material as secret
or top secret" 8
Senator Muskie has favored an indepen-
dent review board on classified material,119
and, clearly, Reid has become even more
convinced of the need for such a body, "ac-
countable to the Congress and the people,"
with "the authority and resources to evalu-
ate classified documents and order disclas-
sification of those which are being im-
properly withheld from the public domain"
-especially after the denial of his suit for
full disclosure of the Pentagon Papers by
Judge Gesell. It was the observation of the
Congressman, that some way had to be
found to break the pattern of the executive
branch in withholding information from the
Congress and public. 120
118 See note 59 supra.
119 See note 109 supra at 15.
120 See note 107 supra.
Lest it be otherwise ignored in the issues
generated over the Pentagon Papers, their
publication raises still another question of
whether the public's right to know is so
absolute and all-pervasive that it justifies
any means, including the theft of govern-
ment documents, that will serve the end of
public disclosure; for, in fact, the papers
were apparently stolen.' 21 Daniel Ellsberg,
who allegedly distributed most of the secret
Pentagon study he had worked on in 1967
to the New York Times,122 after having
previously offered some of the classified
documents to several members of Con-
gress123 could not be considered a hero,
but, perhaps a self-appointed surrogate for
the people, instead, who respected nothing
but the achievements of his own ends.' 24
Chief Justice Burger was moved to remark
on the paper pilfering that he was naive
enough to think that every citizen coming
into possession of stolen property had a
"basic and simple duty" to "report forth-
with to responsible public officers."' 25
V
Thus far the scope of this paper has
dealt with the right to know in this country.
Yet, all channels of news, for example,
must be kept open with equality of access
to information at the source. It would be
121 See letter by Frank Greenberg in Chicago
Daily News, July 20, 1971, at 10.
122 TIME, July 5, 1971, at 6-8.
123 NEWSWEEK, June 28, 1971, at 16. See Note,
The Right of Government Employees to Furnish
Information to Congress: Statutory and Consti-
tutional Aspects, 57 VA. L. REV. 885 (1971),
for a discussion of subordinates communicating
information to Congress relative to any legisla-
tive purpose.
124 See note 121 supra.
125 Id.
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highly desirable, therefore, if an interna-
tional agreement of complete freedom from
censorship for the press media throughout
the world could be achieved. Such an agree-
ment among the states of the world would
be a valuable contribution to future peace,
and, hopefully, there would be no more
truth within foreign nations to the words of
Beaumarchais as he commented on censor-
ship in The Marriage of Figaro:
They all tell me that if in my writings I
mention neither the government, nor public
worship, nor politics, nor morals, nor peo-
ple in office, nor influential corporations,
nor the opera, nor the other theaters, nor
anyone who has aught to do with anything,
I may print everything freely, subject to the
approval of two or three censors. 126
In conclusion, a public demand for full
disclosure of essential facts for public scru-
tiny is all important. Too often, military
and diplomatic excuses tend to cover up
bungling or failure. The American public
is entitled to decide its own fate, and open
and candid presentation of pertinent facts
-within the bounds of national security-
is essential to this process of freedom.
126 See note 61 supra. See also Anastaplo, Pre-
liminary Reflections on the Pentagon Papers, 64
U. CHI. MAGAZINE No. 3 (1972); Anastaplo,
The Pentagon Papers and the Rule of "No Prior
Restraints," 64 U. CHI. MAGAZINE No. 4 (1972);
Prisoners Win Right to Communicate with
Media, 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. No. 12 (1972)
(Nolan v. Fitzpatrick-lst Circuit); S. Res. 299,
92d Cong., 2d Sess., 118 CONG. REC. S7317
(daily ed. May 5, 1972) (Submission of a Res-
olution Establishing a Select Committee to Study
Questions Relating to Secret and Confidential
Government Documents); 118 CONG. REC.
S.7387-7393 (daily ed. May 5, 1972) (Remarks
of Senators Church, Symington, Hansen and
Stennis on Foreign Relations Authorization Act
of 1972).
